We examine the stability of risk preferences across contexts involving di¤erent stakes. Using data on households' deductible choices in three property insurance coverages and their limit choices in two liability insurance coverages, we assess the stability across the …ve contexts in the ordinal ranking of the households' willingness to bear risk. We …nd evidence of stability across contexts involving stakes of the same magnitude, but not across contexts involving stakes of very di¤erent magnitudes. Our results appear to be robust to heterogeneity in wealth and access to credit, complicating seemingly ready explanations. (JEL D12, D81, G22)
Introduction
Classical theories of risky choice posit that risk preferences are stable across decision contexts. The stability hypothesis re ‡ects a basic tenet of rational choice theory known as invariance (Tversky and Kahneman 1986) or context independence (Hausman 2012) . Context independence requires that preferences over options be invariant to the aspects of the choice situation other than the economic fundamentals, which in the case of risky options are the induced lotteries over outcomes.
Broadly speaking, the empirical literature on the stability hypothesis o¤ers two main …ndings.
On the one hand, studies that focus on the (strong) hypothesis of full stability-which usually take a structural approach and examine the within-person consistency of model-based estimates of risk aversion across domains-generally …nd that a person's risk aversion di¤ers from one domain to the next, suggesting that risk preferences are not perfectly stable across contexts (e.g., Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum 2011) . On the other hand, studies that focus on the (weak) hypothesis of some stability-which usually take a model-free approach and examine the within-person correlation of risk taking across domains-generally …nd that a person who takes on more risk in one context tends to do so in other contexts as well, suggesting that risk preferences have a stable component and are not entirely context dependent (e.g., ).
We provide new evidence on the stability hypothesis using data on households'coverage choices in …ve insurance contexts. A key feature of our data is that three contexts involve small-stakes choices while two involve large-stakes choices. The small-stakes choices are deductibles in three lines of property insurance: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. The large-stakes choices are limits in two lines of liability insurance: auto single limit and home personal liability.
We adopt the model-free approach of and assess the stability in ranking across the …ve contexts of each household's willingness to bear risk relative to its peers. Essentially, we rank the coverage options by risk within each context and compute the pairwise rank correlations among the households'choices across the …ve contexts. In our preferred baseline speci…cation, we estimate the rank correlations controlling for variation across households in the price of coverage and the risk of loss in each context.
Studies Using Market Data
In an early paper, Wolf and Pohlman (1983) compare the risk aversion of a dealer in U.S. government securities as …rst measured by his assessments of hypothetical wealth gambles and then estimated from his bid choices in Treasury bill auctions. The authors take a structural approach and assume the dealer is an expected utility (EU) maximizer. They …nd that "the dealer was substantially more risk averse in his bid choices than his assessments predicted" and conclude that people's "degree of risk aversion may depend on the speci…c context in which their choices are made" (p. 849).
Though pioneering, Wolf and Pohlman (1983) has two important limitations. First, it studies one person. Second, it compares hypothetical choices with market choices, which confounds the question of stability with that of external validity. Overcoming these limitations, Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011) examine the deductible choices of 702 households across three insurance contexts: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. Assuming that households are EU maximizers, the authors obtain three interval estimates of each household's risk aversion based on its three choices. They …nd that these intervals intersect-implying that the choices can be rationalized by the same degree of risk aversion-for only 23 percent of households, leading them to reject the hypothesis of full stability.
Rejecting the hypothesis of full stability does not imply that risk preferences have no stable component. Moreover, structural approaches to testing stability invariably comprise a joint test of the stability hypothesis and the assumptions of the structural model. With these points in mind, examine the workplace bene…ts choices made by 12,752 Alcoa employees in six contexts: health insurance, drug insurance, dental insurance, short-term disability insurance, long-term disability insurance, and 401(k) investments. The authors pursue a model-free approach (which we adopt here) in which they rank by risk the options within each context and assess the rank correlation of the employees' choices across the six contexts. They …nd that an employee's choice in each context is positively rank correlated with her choice in every other context, with stronger correlations across "closer" contexts (p. 2609), leading them to reject the hypothesis of no stability and conclude that risk preferences have a context-invariant component. 2 In the wake of this methodological shift, Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2016) explore the connection between full stability under a structural approach and rank stability under a modelfree approach. Using data on the deductible choices of 3,629 households across the three insurance contexts studied by Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011) , the authors document two …ndings: (i) the households'deductible choices are positively rank correlated, echoing the …nding of , and (ii) …ve in six households exhibit full stability under a rank-dependent EU model. They then show that the fully stable households drive the rank correlations.
Our paper builds directly on . Like them, we take a model-free approach and examine rank stability across multiple contexts using data on market choices. The main distinction between our papers is the degree to which the stakes vary across contexts. In the contexts we study, the dollar values of the options range from the hundreds and thousands (in our small-stakes contexts) to the hundreds of thousands and millions (in our large-stakes contexts). As we discuss in Section 4.3, the dollar values of the options in range from the hundreds and thousands (in three contexts) to the tens of thousands (in the others). It is this distinction that reconciles our results. Both papers …nd evidence of rank stability across contexts involving stakes of the same or near orders of magnitude, while ours also …nds evidence of rank instability across contexts involving stakes of remote orders of magnitude. 3 Anderson and Mellor (2009) compare the responses of laboratory subjects to a series of hypothetical job gambles and a series of hypothetical inheritance gambles. The authors construct a categorical measure of the subjects' risk aversion based on the job gamble responses and then do the same for the inheritance gamble responses. They …nd that 34 percent of subjects exhibit the same degree of risk aversion across the two contexts and report a rank correlation of 0.175 between the two measures. 4 Dohmen et al. (2011) use survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to compare respondents' self-reported willingness to take risks across …ve contexts: car driving, …nancial matters, sports and leisure, health, and career. The authors report that while the responses "are not perfectly correlated across contexts, . . . the pairwise correlations are large, typically in the neighborhood of 0.5," which they argue "is suggestive of a stable, underlying risk trait" (p. 537).
Studies Using Nonmarket Data
More recently, Ioannou and Sadeh (2016) compare the selections made by laboratory subjects from a set of real monetary gambles and a set of real "environmental" gambles (where the payo¤s are numbers of bee-friendly plants). The authors …nd that subjects "exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the environmental domain relative to the monetary domain; that is, individuals tend to be more reluctant to take on large gambles with environmental outcomes than with monetary ones" (p. 31). 5 In addition to using nonmarket data, these studies di¤er from ours in that they either lack meaningful variation in stakes across contexts (e.g., Anderson and Mellor 2009; Ioannou and Sadeh 2016) or they study general domains of risky behavior in which the stakes are neither explicit nor well-de…ned (e.g., Barksy et al. 1997; Dohmen et al. 2011) .
Data and Sample
The source of our data is a large U.S. property and casualty insurance company. Our dataset contains annual information on more than 400,000 households who purchased auto or home insurance from the company between 1998 and 2007. The data contain all the information in the company's records regarding the households and their policies, including claims information.
We focus on three small-stakes choices and two large-stakes choices. The small-stakes choices are deductibles in three lines of property coverage: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. Auto collision coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle caused by a collision with another vehicle or object, without regard to fault. Auto comprehensive coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle from all other causes, without regard to fault. Home all perils coverage pays for damage to the insured home from all causes, except those that are speci…cally excluded (e.g., ‡ood). The deductible options range from $100 to $1,000 in auto collision, $50 to $1,000 in auto comprehensive, and $100 to $5,000 in home all perils. The mean increment between options is $225 in auto collision, $190 in auto comprehensive, and $980 in home all perils.
The large-stakes choices are limits in two lines of liability coverage: auto single limit and home personal liability. Auto single limit coverage pays for bodily injury or property damage to others for which the insured driver is legally responsible. Home personal liability coverage pays for bodily injury or property damage to others for which the insured homeowner is legally responsible. The limit options range from $60,000 to $1,000,000 in auto single limit and $100,000 to $1,000,000 in 5 In another incentivized experiment, Choi et al. (2007) test within-subject consistency (assuming maximization of a well-behaved concave utility function) across 50 risky portfolio choices. They …nd that while only 17 percent of subjects exhibit perfect consistency (app. C), a "signi…cant majority" perform "only a bit worse" (pp. 1927-1928) . More to the point, the authors report (without providing details) that "some subjects" exhibit a "switching" patternsometimes choosing extremely safe portfolios, sometimes choosing extremely risky portfolios, and sometimes chooisng intermediate portfolios-wherein their choices are "individually consistent" with risk averse utility maximization but "mutually inconsistent" with one another (pp. 1925 & 1936-1937). home personal liability. The mean increment between options is $188,000 in auto single limit and $180,000 in home personal liability.
Our baseline sample comprises households who (i) purchased all three property coverages and both liability coverages and (ii) …rst purchased each coverage within any six-month window during the period from 2004 to 2007. The latter restriction helps avoid temporal issues, such as changes in household characteristics or the economic environment. We consider only the households'coverage choices at the time of …rst purchase. This helps ensure that we are working with active choices; one might worry that households renew their policies without actively reassessing their coverage options (Handel 2013) . These restrictions yield a baseline sample of 2,690 households.
For each household in our baseline sample, we observe its deductible or limit choice (as the case may be) in each coverage, as well as the pricing menu it faced in each coverage. According to conversations with the company and an independent agent who sells company policies, the choice environment is conducive to households making active and informed choices-there are no default choices, the pricing menu is available to a household when it makes a choice, and a household must choose a deductible or limit separately for each coverage. Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for the baseline sample. Table 1 reports demographic characteristics and claim frequencies. Table 2 summarizes the coverage choices and pricing menus.
Methods and Results

Empirical Strategy and Baseline Results
We adopt the model-free approach of and assess the stability in ranking across contexts of each household's willingness to bear risk relative to its peers. To begin, we rank the options by risk within each context, ordering them from highest to lowest risk exposure. There are …ve or six options in each context (see Table 2 ). The safest option is the lowest deductible in property coverages and the highest limit in the liability coverages. We then compute the pairwise Spearman rank correlations in the households'choices across the …ve contexts.
examine the correlation structure of the residuals from a system of …ve equations:
(1) Following , we estimate system (1) in two di¤erent ways. First, we treat it as a multivariate ordered probit regression model and estimate it by maximum likelihood. 7 Second, we treat it as a multivariate linear regression model and estimate it by least squares. Because the set of options in each context is discrete, the probit regression is our preferred speci…cation. Table 3 reports the baseline results. Panel A shows the Spearman rank correlations. Panels B and C display the estimated correlations from the probit and linear regressions, respectively.
Each panel tells the same story. Across all panels, the correlation between each pair of small-stakes choices is positive, ranging from 0:26 to 0:70. Similarly, the correlation between the two largestakes choices is positive, ranging from 0:44 to 0:57. By contrast, however, the correlation between every pairing of a small-stakes choice and a large-stakes choice is negative, ranging from 0:05 to 0:34. Overall, the baseline results suggest that the households exhibit a fairly stable degree of risk aversion relative to their peers across contexts that involve stakes of the same order of magnitude.
At the same time, however, the results suggest that households who exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion than their peers in small-stakes contexts tend to exhibit a lower degree of risk aversion than their peers in large-stakes contexts, and vice versa.
Sensitivity Analysis 4.2.1 Umbrella Coverage
Twenty-six percent of the households in the baseline sample purchased umbrella liability coverage from the company to supplement their auto single limit and home personal liability coverages. The umbrella coverage options range from $1 million to $5 million in $1 million increments, and the premium associated with each coverage option is the same for all households.
The baseline results disregard the households'umbrella choices. To explore whether this biases our results, we treat households who purchased umbrella coverage as having chosen a new "highest limit" option (i.e., a limit of unspeci…ed amount greater than $1,000,000) in auto single limit and home personal liability, and we re-estimate (1) treating it as a system of ordered probits and including the baseline set of controls. 8 Table 4 , panel A reports the results, which tell the same story as the baseline results. Indeed, all but one of the pairwise correlations involving a liability insurance context are stronger than the corresponding baseline correlations. The only exception is the correlation between home all perils and home personal liability, which is slightly weaker than the corresponding baseline correlation. 9
Wealth
Economists have long hypothesized that risk preferences depend on wealth (Friedman and Savage 1948; Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971) . The standard assumption is that absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, which implies that, ceteris paribus, a household's willingness to pay for insurance 8 We do not add a price control for umbrella coverage because the premiums do not vary across households. 9 As a further check, we also re-estimate (1), again treating it as a system of ordered probits and including the baseline set of controls, on the subsample of 1,993 households who did not purchase umbrella coverage. Those results also tell the same story as the baseline results. decreases with its wealth. See, for example, Pratt (1964, pp. 122-123) : "Utility functions for which [the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion] is decreasing are logical candidates to use when trying to describe the behavior of people who, one feels, might generally pay less for insurance against a given risk the greater their assets."
Our baseline analysis does not control for household wealth. To examine whether wealth e¤ects may be driving our results, we add a control for wealth to the baseline set of controls and re-estimate (1) treating it as a system of ordered probits. We do not directly observe a household's wealth in our data, but we do observe a plausible proxy: the insured value of the dwelling covered by its homeowners policy ("home value"). Of course, we do not know the correlation between home value and wealth in our data. However, according to combined extract data from the Survey of Consumer Finance, the correlation between home value and wealth is 0.47 (std. err. = 0.002). 
Access to Credit
In theory, a household's ability to borrow after a loss event can a¤ect its demand for insurance (Handel, Hendel, and Whinston 2015; Ja¤e and Malani 2017) . To investigate whether di¤erences in access to credit may be driving our results, we add controls for households'insurance scores in auto and home to the baseline set of controls and re-estimate (1) treating it as a system of ordered probits. Insurance scores are akin to credit scores. Both are derived using the same …ve categories of information contained in credit reports (payment history, level of indebtedness, length of credit history, new credit and pursuit of new credit, and types of credit), though they di¤er somewhat in how they weight these categories (Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum 2017) . For this reason, we believe that insurance score, like credit score, is a good proxy for a household's access to credit. 10 Table 4 , panel C reports the results. Again, each pairwise correlation is virtually identical to the corresponding baseline correlation. This suggests that di¤erences in access to credit are not driving our results. 11
Choice Window
In the baseline sample, we restrict attention to households who, inter alia, purchased all …ve coverages within a six-month window. There are two opposing considerations in selecting a choice window. On the one hand, a narrower window helps to avoid what Einav et al. ( , p. 2611 call "the problems of inferring preferences from 'stale'choices," which they note "could be particularly concerning if individuals might have made their choices . . . at di¤erent points in time." On the other hand, a wider window helps to improve inference by increasing sample size.
We are not concerned that a six-month window is too narrow. Our baseline sample comprises 2,690 households, which we believe is su¢ ciently large to draw valid inferences. To address the concern that a six-month window may be too wide, we re-estimate (1) on the subsample of 1,694 households who purchased all …ve coverages on the same day. As before, we treat (1) as a system of ordered probits and include the baseline set of controls. Table 4 , panel D reports the results.
They tell the same story as the baseline results. Indeed, all but two of the pairwise correlations are stronger than the corresponding baseline correlations. The only exceptions are the pairwise correlations between auto collision and home personal liability and between home all perils and home personal liability, which are slightly weaker than baseline.
Comparison with Einav et al. (2012)
We close this section with a discussion comparing our results with those of .
Using data on the workplace bene…ts choices of 12,752 Alcoa employees, pursue the same model-free approach (which they develop) to assess the rank stability of the employees' risk preferences across six contexts: health insurance, drug insurance, dental insurance, shortterm disability insurance, long-term disability insurance, and 401(k) investments. In their baseline analysis, where they control for variation in bene…t menus, they …nd that an employee's choice in every context is positively rank correlated with its choice in every other context, implying that employees who exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion than their peers in one context tend also to do so in other contexts, and vice versa. They …nd very similar results when they add controls for risk. The strongest pairwise correlations are between short-and long-term disability insurance (0:76) and among health, drug, and dental insurance (ranging from 0:30 to 0:49). Somewhat weaker are the correlations across the disability and medical insurance contexts (ranging from 0:21 to 0:26).
The weakest are between 401(k) investments and every other context (all below 0:05, including two that are slightly negative but not statistically di¤erent from zero). 12 In order to compare our results with those of , we must classify their contexts according to the magnitude of the stakes involved, applying the same criteria that we use to classify our contexts. Recall that in our small-stakes contexts the values of the options and the inter-option increments range in the hundreds and thousands dollars, whereas in our large-stakes contexts the value of the options range in the hundreds of thousands and millions of dollars with inter-option increments that range in the hundreds of thousands dollars.
For the reasons we detail in the Online Appendix, we conclude that none of the contexts in involve large-stakes choices. Speci…cally, we conclude that three contextshealth, drug, and dental insurance-involve small-stakes choices. In two contexts-short-term disability insurance and 401(k) investments-we determine that the stakes range in the thousands and tens of thousands of dollars but not the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and so we classify them as moderate-stakes contexts. We also classify the remaining context-long-term disability insurance-as involving moderate-stakes choices, though the reasons are less straightforward. 13 Given these classi…cations, we see that our results and those of complement one another. We both …nd a pattern of positive pairwise correlations among small-stakes choices. To this common result, add two …ndings: patterns of positive (or at least non-negative) pairwise correlations among moderate-stake choices and across small-and moderate-stakes choices. We also add two …ndings. The …rst is a pattern of positive pairwise correlations among large-stakes choices, which taken together with the previous …ndings hints at a stable component of risk preferences that operates across contexts involving stakes of the same or near orders of magnitude. The second …nding that we add to the mix is our main contribution: a pattern of negative pairwise correlations across small-and large-stakes choices, which hints at a lack of risk preference stability across contexts involving stakes of remote orders of magnitude.
There is another way to see how we build on . Leaving 401(k) investments aside for the moment, …nd (i) moderately positive correlations between contexts involving stakes of the same order of magnitude (small/small or moderate/moderate) and (ii) weakly positive correlations between contexts involving stakes of adjacent orders of magnitude (small/moderate). We corroborate the …rst …nding (for small/small) and extend it (to large/large) and progressively add a third: (iii) weakly negative correlations between contexts involving stakes of remote orders of magnitude (small/large). Returning to 401(k) investments, acknowledge that this context is "the most di¢ cult to reconcile with any of the others" (p. 2636), and they attribute the di¢ culty to a di¤erence in kind between investments and insurance. Our results suggest an alternative explanation: employees may perceive 401(k) investments as a borderline large-stakes context, particularly if they view their allocation choice as applying to more than just their current year's contributions. This could explain the extremely weak correlations (more or less zero) between 401(k) investments and every other context in .
Discussion
We examine the hypothesis that risk preferences have a stable, context-invariant component using data on households' insurance choices. We study …ve insurance contexts, three involving smallstakes choices (deductibles) and two involving large-stakes choices (liability limits). Adopting the model-free approach of , we assess the extent to which the households'choices display a stable ranking in their willingness to bear risk relative to their peers. While we …nd that the households'choices re ‡ect a stable ranking in risk taking across the three small-stakes choices and across the two large-stakes choices, we also …nd that the households who take on more risk than their peers in small-stakes contexts tend to take on less risk than their peers in large-stakes contexts, and vice versa, which does not support the stability hypothesis.
What could explain our results? Three stories come readily to mind. None is unassailable, however, and so each leaves open questions for future research.
The …rst is a story about relative risk aversion. Suppose that rich households choose higher deductibles and higher liability limits than poor households. The intuition might be that rich households want insurance against large losses but not small losses (which they can self-insure at a lower cost), whereas poor households want insurance against small losses but not large losses (because you can't get blood from a stone). This pattern of choices, which could explain our results, could arise from a population of households with standard EU preferences and heterogeneous relative risk aversion. Standard EU preferences feature a concave utility function that is de…ned over wealth and exhibits DARA (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971) . 14 Concavity implies a positive willingness to pay for insurance. Let denote this willingness. DARA implies that decreases with wealth, which could account for rich households choosing higher deductibles than poor households. If the utility function also exhibits IRRA/CRRA/DRRA, 15 then, ceteris paribus, is increasing/constant/decreasing in stakes (Menezes and Hanson 1970; Zeckhauser and Keeler 1970) . Thus, the right kind of heterogeneity in relative risk aversion (e.g., rich households have IRRA and poor households have CRRA) could account for rich households also choosing higher liability limits than poor households. This story, while plausible, has at least two important counterpoints. The …rst is our analysis in Section 4.2.2, which casts doubt on the possibility that wealth di¤erences are behind our results.
The second is the Rabin (2000) critique, which contends that EU theory is not a plausible model of risk aversion across small-and large-stakes gambles. 16 A second story features consumption commitments (i.e., spending obligations that are costly to adjust). Suppose that some households have consumption commitments while others do not. Chetty and Szeidl (2007) show that, within an EU framework, consumption commitments can induce non-concavities in the utility function (cf. Friedman and Savage 1948; Markowitz 1952 ) that increase risk aversion over small-and moderate-stakes gambles relative to large-stakes gambles.
Hence, the right kind of heterogeneity in consumption commitments (e.g., committed households have lower risk aversion over large-stakes gambles than other households) could generate a pattern of choices in which committed households choose lower deductibles and lower liability limits than other households, which could explain our results.
Again, this story, while plausible, is complicated by our sensitivity analysis. One implication of Chetty and Szeidl's (2007) theory is that consumption commitments "have a larger e¤ect on risk aversion when agents are borrowing constrained" (p. 850). It follows that if heterogeneity in consumption commitments were driving our results, we would expect them to be sensitive to di¤erences in access to credit. Our analysis in Section 4.2.3, however, suggests they are not. 17 Probability distortions headline a third possible story. Suppose that households' subjective beliefs (in a subjective EU model) or decision weights (in a rank-dependent EU model) do not correspond to the objective risks. The right kind of heterogeneity in such beliefs or weights could explain our results. For example, suppose that some households overweight loss probabilities in large-stakes gambles but not small-stakes gambles, while other households overweight loss probabilities in small-stakes gambles but not large-stakes gambles. This could lead the former households to choose higher deductibles and higher liability limits than the latter households. Alternatively, suppose that some households grossly overweight loss probabilities in small-stakes gambles and mildly overweight them in large-stakes gambles, while other households do not overweight loss probabilities in any gambles (cf. Fehr-Duda et al. 2010) . 18 If in addition the former households are low risk while the other households are high risk, this could lead the former to choose lower deductibles and lower liability limits than the latter.
The issue with each version of this story is that it requires a peculiar heterogeneity structure. (Indeed, we could level this criticism against the …rst two stories as well.) We are not aware of any empirical or theoretical support for the kind of heterogeneity-including, in some versions, the correlation between probability distortions and risk types-that is required by this story.
In future research it would be worthwhile to further probe these and other potential explanations of our results and to explore whether similar results obtain in other comparable datasets. Notes: Panels A, B, and C provide results for the baseline sample of 2,690 households. Panel D provides results for the subsample of 1,694 households who purchased all five coverages on the same day. Each cell reports a pairwise correlation coefficient estimated from a system of ordered probits with controls for prices and risk. In panel A, households who purchased umbrella coverage are treated as having chosen a new "highest limit" option in both auto single limit and home personal liability. In panel B, the probit regression includes an additional control for wealth. In panel C, the probit regression includes additional controls for insurance scores in auto and home. For each correlation coefficient, the p-value associated with a test of whether the coefficient is different from zero is less than 0.01. The only exception is the correlation coefficient between auto comprehensive and auto single limit in panels B and C, for which the associated p-value is 0.015. 
Mean
Online Appendix to
Risk Controls
The risk controls are expected annual claims under each coverage based on separate Poisson-gamma Bayesian credibility models. More speci…cally, we assume that household i's claims under coverage j in year t follow a Poisson distribution with arrival rate ijt . We treat ijt as a latent random variable and assume that ln ijt = z 0 ijt j + ij ,where z ijt is a vector of observables, j is a vector of coe¢ cients, ij is an iid error term, and exp( ij ) follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance j . Utilizing our full dataset, we perform separate Poisson panel regressions with random e¤ects to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of j and j for each coverage j. For each household i in the baseline sample, we then calculate the expected number of claims b ij for each coverage j, conditional on the household's ex ante characteristics z ij and ex post claims experience ij , as follows:
follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance b j . Observe that by construction b ij takes into account both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of a households'risk type. 1 2 Classi…cation of the Contexts in In order to compare our results with those of , we classify each of their contexts according to the magnitude of the stakes involved. Moreover, we apply the same criteria to classify annual contribution is approximately $4,600 and the maximum allowable is $18,000, 5 with Alcoa matching contributions up to six percent. This suggests that the stakes range approximately from $2; 200 to $8,300 for the average contributor and from $8; 500 to $32,400 for all contributors.
We also classify the remaining context-long-term disability insurance-as involving moderatestakes choices, though the classi…cation is less straightforward than in the other contexts. Alcoa's long-term disability plan replaces lost wages due to disability for durations longer than six-months, subject to a six-month elimination period. 6 Employees choose among three wage-replacement rates: 50 percent, 60 percent, or 70 percent. At the mean claim duration, which report is approximately one year, 7 this suggests that the value of the bene…t ranges approximately from $29,000 to $41,000 for the average employee and does not exceed $80,000 for 95 percent of employees. At the maximum claim duration, which we assume could be as long as 45 years, 8 the present value of the bene…t could range into the hundred of thousands of dollars; but even in this extreme case the present value of the inter-option increments would range in the tens of thousands of dollars. 9 All things considered, we conclude the stakes are best classi…ed as moderate.
returns is taken from Appendix Table A2 in , which reports summary statistics of the funds' monthly returns from August 2005 to December 2007. 5 Einav et al. (2012) state that the choices were made in 2004. We assume they re ‡ect bene…t elections for 2005. In 2005, the annual contribution limit was $14,000 for employees under age 50 and $18,000 for older employees. 6 The elimination period is the period of time between the onset of disability and the time at which the employee is eligible to receive bene…ts.
7 note that their claims data are truncated at about two years, which suggests the mean claim duration may be longer than one year. In a recent study of employer-provided long-term disability insurance, Autor, Duggan, and Gruber (2014) report a mean claim duration of 1.55 years and a median of one year. Their sample consists of approximately 8 million quarterly observations from nearly 10,000 unique employers, and their claims data span eight years.
8 do not report the maximum claim duration (or the 95th percentile) in their data, nor do they report the maximum bene…t period under Alcoa's long-term disability plan. The maxmimum bene…t period under many long-term disability plans is 2, 5, or 10 years, but under the most generous plans it runs until the employee's social securty full retirement age, which is 67 for employee's born in 1960 or later. Assuming that Alcoa's plan has the most generous maximum bene…t period and that its youngest eligible employee is 22 years old, we arrive at the assumption that the maximum claim duration could be as long as 45 years. 9 We are assuming annual discount rates well in excess of 10 percent, which is consistent with the preponderance of the empirical evidence on time preferences (Frederick, Lowenstein, and O'Donohue 2002, pp. 377-380) . For instance, Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimate the personal discount rates of approximately 66,000 U.S. millitary personnel who were o¤ered separation bene…ts that consisted of a choice between a lump sum or an annuity, where the break-even discount rate was at least 17.5 percent. They …nd that "over half of the o¢ cers and over 90 percent of enlisted personnel chose the lump-sum payment, implying that the vast majority of personnel had discount rates of at least 18 percent" (p. 33). Based on regression analysis, they report mean discount rates of between 10 percent and 19 percent for o¢ cers and between 35 percent and 54 percent for enlisted personnel, depending on the model speci…cation (p. 48, tbl. 6). As Frederick, Lowenstein, and O'Donohue (2002, p. 385) note, this …eld study "is particularly compelling in terms of credibility of reward delivery, magnitude of stakes, and number of subjects."
